Dynamic Atomism

Statement of this Theory.—The root ideas of this system may be stated as follows;

(1) Matter is essentially homogeneous.

(2) All material phenomena can be accounted for by purely mechanical forces, that is, by forces capable of producing only

movement.

(3) Atoms are unchangeable and always retain their own being throughout all the phases of their evolution.

The first and the third propositions are borrowed from mechanism and constitute the common principle for both these theories. The second proposition, in which mechanical energies are substituted for local motion, contains the distinctive feature of dynamic atomism. There is a general agreement among authors about these primary tenets, but dissension appears when it is a question of determining the number and nature of the forces put into play by matter. Some authors divide these mechanical forces into three classes: (1) forces of attraction and repulsion, which act from a distance and tend unceasingly to produce motion; (2) forces of impulsion, the peculiarity of which is to communicate motion by shock or pressure; (3) the force of inertia, which maintains beings in their state of rest or of movement in a straight line [MARTIN, Philosophic de la stature, II, p. 87]. Other authors endow matter with gravity as its one and only essential fundamental force, thus making all other energies different modes of the force of gravity [JAHR, Urkraft der Gravitation: ‘Light, heat, magnetism, electricity, chemical force are secondary manifestations of the elementary force of the of the world’ (Berlin, 1889)]. Others again assert the force of resistance, which is essentially inherent in matter, to be the only truly irreducible energy [TONGIORGI, Cosmologia, lib. I, C. 3. a. 2]. Finally many scientists find the dual theory that there are only forces of attraction and repulsion the most satisfactory.

Criticism of Dynamic Atomism.

First Principle: Homogeneity of Matter.— The great outstanding fact noticeable in all that happens in the universe is the double teleological tendency in organization and destination of the works of Nature. Every body shows itself to be the subject of an immanent tendency in virtue of which it follows its natural purpose according to certain invariable laws. The mechanist fails to recognize this fundamental principle manifested by the orderliness of the universe and the constant recurrence of the same species, and in consequence is encountered by insurmountable difficulties in chemistry, physics and crystallography. So likewise the dynamic atomist by professing the homogeneity of matter suppresses all intrinsic finality, or at least deprives it of its chief features.

Indeed there can be no place for elective tendencies so long as all matter is the same, seeing that if bodies of the same nature possess inherent tendencies, they cannot tend but towards exactly the same ends. Whereas it is precisely the diversity of intrinsic tendencies which accounts for the diversity of the properties of beings, for the difference in their activities or, in a word, for the order of the universe.

A second and no less serious consequence of this mitigated form of mechanism is that, if atoms are indestructible and unchangeable, essential unity would seem to belong only to atomic masses, and accordingly inorganic compounds together with vegetable, animal and even human structures must be regarded as mere aggregations of individual atoms held together by mechanical forces: a conclusion which is counter to the results both of biology and of metaphysics.

Second Principle: All Material Forces are Simply Mechanical .— Although material forces are always accompanied by local movement and on this account can be called mechanical forces, many of them have in addition a specific mode of action. Such are the physical energies of light, electricity, heat and sound. The chief function of these is to produce different qualities which we call thermal state, colour, etc., states which are each manifestly irreducible to a simple displacement of matter and which are therefore essentially distinguished from ordinary mechanical forces, the proper effect of which is solely local motion [Cp. BOUBROUX, De la contingence des lois de la nature (6th ed. Paris, 1908)]

Thus speak facts. Now dynamic atomism, by denying this specific diversity of forces, contradicts the verdict of our senses without being justified by any data from experience in doing so. Indeed there are physicists of the highest repute who do not hesitate to say that not a fact of science has yet been ascertained which warrants the reduction of all material energies to purely mechan ical forces [Cp. DUHEM, L’Evolution de la mechanique.]

An Objection.—Heat, sound, light, etc. are all subject to the same general laws of reflection, refraction, and interference. Now it is difficult to understand such a fact as this if these energies are distinguished from one another by qualities which are specifically distinct.

We reply that whilst it is beyond dispute that many of the physical laws apply to some of the energies we regard as heterogeneous, there is nothing in this fact which either militates against the Scholastic theory or proves the homogeneity of material forces. For all the laws discovered by experimental physics concern the mechanical aspect of phenomena; and according to the Scholastic teaching all activity, whatsoever its nature, is always accompanied by movement. Hence it is not to be wondered at that owing to this common property all forces are subject to certain general laws of physics.

Conclusions.—Dynamic atomism is a half measure. As a reaction against mechanism it acknowledges that if matter is despoiled of every internal principle of activity, philosophy cannot hope to give an ultimate explanation of the facts which present themselves and must leave the universe to the caprice of chance. It keeps in view then the order of the universe and allows that matter has forces properly so called. But it denies a substantial diversity between beings and in so far fails to give an explanation of the constant diversity of the groups of accidental properties. It makes a step in the direction of Scholasticism but does not logically arrive at it because it is content to leave the problem of cosmology only partly solved.