Principal Ideas of this Theory.—The dynamic conception has been put forward under many forms. It was constructed by Leibniz (1646—1716) into a complete system of cosmology, and since has undergone many profound changes, especially during the last century. The chief ideas of the many forms in vogue at the present day may be summed up in the following propositions,

CRITICISM OF DYNAMISM

2 In the hypothesis of dynamism the perception of even purely phenomenal extension is an anomaly lacking all explanation. Indeed what can be its cause ? Not the senses, for if dynamism is true, the senses themselves are made up of simple unextended elements that do not possess, either formally or in an embryonic state, the integral elements of real extension. Nor can the cause be the combined influence of external agencies, because here again are only simple principles whose unextended actions if they come into contact meet in a single indivisible point.

An Objection.—No material body, it may be objected, enjoys a real continuity. The most compact masses are full of lacunae or pores—interatomic or intermolecular spaces. Our organs of sight misinform us when they represent bodies as continuous wholes. Extension is therefore apparent.

This we willingly admit, that in the mineral world true continuity belongs only to atoms and to molecules in the compound. We admit that every sensible mass is a collection of minute particles between which we can without difficulty conceive apparent or real intervals of space. If our senses are incapable of perceiving the small interstices that break up the extension of material bodies it is because they are imperfect instruments. But, we argue, this imperfection in no way diminishes the real objectivity of our perception of extension, since every external agent, atomic and molecular mass alike, if taken as a whole, does really possess this quality. The general effect produced in our sense-organs thus receives a complete explanation in the Scholastic theory: the subjective representation of a continuous extension has a real cause, namely the influence of the particles each of which has itself a continuous extension, whilst the absence of divisions in external objects is due to the natural limitations our faculties have in their perceptions.

Proof Drawn from Unity.—The theory of dynamism strikes a fatal blow at the unity of higher beings. For either the simple forces that constitute a being come into contact or they ‘act at a distance’. If they come into contact they all coincide in a mathematical point, inasmuch as two indivisible beings in contact touch each other according to the totality of their being. If they do not come into contact, then a living being is a collection of individual particles which are capable of mutual influence only on the supposition that actio in distans is possible—an hypothesis physically impossible.

An Objection.—Force is an absolutely simple reality; extension on the contrary is liable indefinitely to division. Force is essentially active, whilst extension is synonymous with passivity or complete inertia. But two contrary properties cannot possibly belong to the same subject ~.

The fallacy of this objection consists in making extension and force two opposed realities whereas they are simply realities of different natures. The idea of force represents power of action, and nothing more. It in no way reveals to us the mode of the material being according to which this power Is realized. Whether force be actually in form no more than a mathematical point or whether it occupies a definite portion of space, the idea of it remains the same; in a word, it abstracts from all spatial relations. Hence it may be applied either to energies which are extended, such as physical and mechanical forces, or to forces of a simple nature, such as mind and will. The function of extension, on the other hand, is to expand in space the subject, whatsoever be its nature, to which it belongs.

To escape these criticisms Palmieri and some other dynamists allow a virtual extestsiost to force. This means to say that the atom is not an entity devoid of all real volume; it fills so much definite space, and in each part of this space it remains whole and entire, defending by its force of resistance the Inviolability of itS particular spatial department. Now, it is argued, such atoms even though they are simple can touch one another without complete Interpenetration, and can thus excite in our sense-organs a perception of apparent extension..

What are we to think of this conception? Like the other dynamic systems, it rules out the substasttial ustity of livistg beisigs, since virtually extended atoms cannot be transformed. In the second place, by granting to all beings the same mode of existence, it does away with the essential diflereisce between the spiritual astd material worlds. The atom would be just like the human soul in occupying a definite portion of space and being its own complete self in each part of it; whereas such a mode of being is peculiar to spiritual substances and is the ultimate principle of their immaterial activities. BALMES, Fundamesatal Philosophy, tra. BRowstsoN, Vol. II, Bk. 3’ chap. 24 (New York, 1864).

Although it does not possess any dynamic power, it tends to spread out material energies as well as passive quantity. Hence force and extension are two distinct realities, but such as to be perfectly compatible with one another.

This proposition, which is the antithesis of dynamism, is none other than the Scholastic doctrine. It is proved by the argument appealed to above in support of the dual constitution of bodies, namely the composition of matter and form.

An Objection.—We know bodies only by the actions they exercise on our sense-organs. Any body which is incapable of making an impression upon us must remain unknown. Bodies, therefore, manifest themselves as principles of activity and nothing more.

Criticism.—All phenomena represented by our senses are characterized by extension. Therefore the external causes determining them must, before they can have the properties belonging to their effects, be forces really extended in space. Such is the conclusion to which we are led by the application of the principle dynamists themselves admit, namely that an effect bears the impress and character of the cause which produces it.

Extension, it is true, is not a dynamic power; but if all the forces of nature are affected by this property, it is impossible for them to produce an effect which is unextended, for a force extended in space cannot by mere action lose its manner of being and become a simple force without extension. If then dynamists from the fact of the activities of bodies are justified in making the induction that active substances must exist, we also are equally justified in making the inference, from the fact of extension—the principle of inertia and passivity—that there is in bodies a second constitutive element, very closely united with the first but one which is essentially passive.

Secondly, the passivity of matter, we maintain, is just as manifest as its activity. For all the bodies in the universe stand to one another in the relations of agent and patient. No one body can act without another receiving its activity; and since the body acted upon re-acts against its motor agent, this original agent changes its role and in turn becomes passive. Thus we see that when it is a question of transitive action, activity and passivity are two correlative and inseparable terms; and therefore activity alone does not constitute the whole essence of a body.

Meaning of this Statement.— ‘Distance ‘here means an absolute vacuum. The question proposed here is whether when two bodies are separated from one another by an interval void of all reality they can exercise a real influence upon each other.

1. Is action at a distance in opposition to certain known laws of the material world, or is it not? In other words, is it physically possible?

2. Supposing that immediate contact is, in the ordinary course of nature, an indispensable condition for action, is it in the power of the Creator to dispense with this condition? In other words, is action at a distance metaphysically possible?

Our opinion is that there are undeniable facts to prove the physical impossibility of such activity, but that up to the present there has been discovered no convincing proof of its metaphysical impossibility.

Insufficiency of the A Priori Arguments brought forward to prove the Absolute, or Metaphysical, Impossibility of ‘Action at a Distance’ — The idea of ‘transitive activity’ neither implies nor excludes the notion of immediate contact. Transitive activity supposes on the one hand an agent which possesses force and exercises a causal influence, and on the other a patient receiving it; and between the effect and the cause a relation of proportion as expressed by the principle of causality. The force put into play we cannot conceive to be anywhere but in the agent; for if it is an accidental property it depends upon its subject of inherence, and if a substance, it is identical with the agent. The effect is wholly in the recipient subject which occupies a position outside the agent.

Now does action pass from the agent to the patient? Certainly not; the agent does not cause any accidental reality originally belonging to itself to pass over into the recipient subject, otherwise every efficient activity would be reducible to a simple displacement of pre-existing realities, to a passing over of accidents. Therefore no transference takes place, nothing passes from one to the other; the effect is a new birth, and takes place entirely within the patient under the influence of an external cause (Gen. Metaphysics, 144).

In this analysis neither contact nor distance appears as an indispensable condition of activity. There remains little difficulty, therefore, in showing that all a priori arguments rest on a false conception of activity or else beg the question.

First objection.—In the hypothesis of action at a distance, a being acts in a place where it does not exist. A distinction will help us to answer this objection. To say that if a body acts at a distance (a) the action, i.e. the active force, is in a place where the agent is not, is untrue, for this force is inseparable from its substantial subject of inherence. But (b) action, i.e. the effect realized under the causal influence, is indeed outside the agent. And this is true no matter what theory you hold. If you mean that the agent must be in contact with the terminus of its activity, you are dogmatizing about the very point at issue.

Second objection.—Action at a distance is possible on the condition that the effect is transmitted across the vacuum from the agent to the patient. But such a supposition is absurd.

In reply, we deny the major. An effect is never transmitted either through a void or through a medium. It can never be outside the subject that receives it, being intrinsically dependent upon it for its birth.

Third objection.—To change the patient, the agent must exercise some influence upon it. But such a thing is inconceivable unless there is contact. The major certainly no one will dispute. But the minor is precisely the point under discussion; to assert ~t is not to prove it.

121. The Hypothesis of ‘Action at a Distance’ is Physically Impossible.—All material forces are governed by a constant law, which may be enunciated thus: ‘The intensity of the action that one body exercises on another diminishes in pro-portion as the distance increases; and conversely, it increases in proportion as the distance is diminished’. Now there is no explanation of this fact if the hypothesis of action at a distance is accepted.

Without altering the internal dispositions of the agent and patient—which moreover cannot be altered by a vacuum whether great or small, since it is nothing—we may vary the distance which separates them. The action, considered in the agent, has an intensity which is invariable and independent of the distance, for the reason that material bodies, being destitute of freedom, cannot change the degree of their intensity on their own initiative. Considered in the patient, where nothing is changed, it has the same degree of intensity as it had in the agent. If there were a change, the medium alone would be the cause of it; yet the vacuum is nothingness, and the action, not having to traverse it, cannot lose any of its power in space si. Hence the variations of intensity of which we are informed by experience remain as effects without a cause unless in place of the supposed vacuum we substitute continuous matter, either ponderable or imponderable; and then the progressive diminution of the action depends upon a proportionate cause, namely upon the various resistances of the medium.