(Real order and conceptual order)

This distinction has been omitted by many of the recent English logicians.¹ It is, however, of the highest importance; and the student who has thoroughly grasped its significance, will find his labour in the study of Logic much lightened.

A term of First Intention is one which is applicable to the object, as it exists in the real order,

A term of Second Intention is one which is applicable to the object, only as it exists in the conceptual order.'

Of the terms which may be predicated of an object as signifying its attributes, not all belong to it as it is in the real order. Some belong to it only in so far as it is represented in the mind. Thus I may not only say, "The oak is a forest-tree", "The oak is deciduous" but I may go on to say, "The oak is the subject of my judgment", "The oak is a universal concept". Here, as is manifest, I have two totally different orders of predicates. One sort belongs to the object in its own natural mode of existence the other belongs to it in so far as it is represented conceptually, in so far that is, as it is realized in the logical order. To this class of terms belong many with which we shall have to deal in subsequent discussions, such as genus, species, major, minor and middle term, etc.

These two orders of predicates are called respectively terms ofFirst Intention and terms of Second Intention.

The terminology will be understood, when it is remembered that intentio is a word used by the medieval logicians to signify an act of the mind.

The first act of the mind is that by which the mind conceives and knows the thing as it is in the real order: the second act of the mind is that by which it knows the thing as it is in the conceptual order.

The reason why we claim that the distinction is of primary importance, is that Logic is wholly concerned with the consideration of things as they are in the conceptual order — with things as they are mentally represented, and hence as they are subjects, predicates, universal terms, etc.

It is not concerned with the real order as such, but with the manner in which the mind represents that real order.

Hence Logic is wholly concerned with Second Intentions : and it was not without cause that the medieval logicians defined it simply as the Science of Second Intentions.

Univocal, Equivocal and Analogous Terms.

A Univocal Term is one which is always employed with the same intension.

An Equivocal Term, on the other hand, is one which can be used to express two entirely different meanings, as e.g. the word 'bit' is used to signify either a morsel or part of a horse's harness. Equivocal terms are of no logical importance. Properly speaking an equivocal term is not one but two terms.

An Analogous Term is one which is employed to express meanings partly, but not wholly, the same.

These terms are of two kinds. (1) One class do not, for our purpose, differ from Equivocal terms. The word 'healthy' may serve as an example. As applied to a man, it means that his physical condition is satisfactory. As applied to food, it signifies, not that the food is physically sound, but that it is calculated to produce health in man. The two meanings here, are as distinct as those of an Equivocal term. (2) The other class of Analogous terms must be carefully noticed. These terms do not, it is true, like Univocal terms, convey precisely the same meaning wherever they are employed. When an Analogous term is applied to objects between which the analogy exists, its meaning in the two cases is in so far different, that the characteristic signified is present in different grades. Yet we can express both forms of the characteristic in question by a single concept, because there exists between them a likeness of proportion (analogia).

When for instance we say that God is the 'cause' of the world, and that the sculptor is the 'cause' of the statue, the word 'cause' is analogous. God causes the world in a different sense from that in which the sculptor causes the statue. Yet owing to the proportional resemblance between the two cases, we can form an Analogous concept, and employ an Analogous term.

Similarly the word' thing' is analogous. We say that a man is a 'thing’, and that a thought is a 'thing'; but a man and a thought are not things in the same sense.

Opposition of Terms.

Terms can be opposed to each other in the following ways

1. Contradictory Opposition is the opposition between a term and its negation, e.g. 'man, not-man,' 'white, not-white’. It is characteristic of this opposition that the two terms are not merely mutually exclusive, but they are exhaustive of all possible things. Everything, no matter what it be, whether it be matter or spirit, real or unreal, is either white or not white. The opposition which exists between Repugnant terms, e.g. between 'red 'and' white,' is a special case of Contradictory Opposition. The reason they exclude each other, lies in the fact that while both are colours, they are colours of different species. What is red cannot be also white. It is not-white.
2. Contrary Opposition is the opposition between two classes, which are furthest removed from each other among those which belong to the same genus. Such are, for instance, 'white, black', 'pious, impious’, 'kind, cruel'. This opposition arises because our concepts of certain series of qualities represent them as passing by gradation from one extreme to the other: there is no abrupt transition such as is found to exist between contradictories. Where this gradation of qualities is found, the extremes are known as contraries.

The 'Suppositio' of the Term.

Even where we are dealing with one and the same univocal term there are various ways in which it may be construed. The same term may stand for something different. These various uses of the term were termed by the Latin logicians its suppositiones, (from sup ponere, 'to stand for'). Although a little repetition may be involved, it will be well to distinguish here the principal among the different ways in which a term may be used.

(1) Collective and Distributive use. When anything is affirmed or denied of a plural subject, the predicate may apply either to the individuals, who constitute the subject, taken separately, or to them taken as a group. The former is known as the distributive use (suppositio distributiva) of the term; the latter as the collective use (suppositio collectiva). The propositions, "The citizens raised a monument to the dead statesman", and "The citizens voted in the election", will sufficiently illustrate the two cases.

(2) Real and Logical use. This distinction depends on whether the speaker refers to the object as it is in the real order, or as it is in his concept. Thus, if I say "The King of England is at Windsor", the use is real (suppositio realis). If I say, "'The King of England' is the subject of my sentence" the use is logical (suppositio logica).

(3) Suppositio materialis. When a word is taken to signify simply the spoken sound, or the written symbol, it is said to be used in its suppositio materialis, e.g. "To run" is a verb. "Run" is a word of three letters.

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